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The classification of the various types of judicial biog-
raphy given above is necessarily arlcitrary. Many biogra-
phies may be placed in more than one category, and the
truly great biography by no means must encompass all of
these approaches. The judicial biographer has succeeded if
what Carlyle said of Boswell can be said of him. "Boswell,"
he wrote, "in spite of his sneaking sycophancies, wrote a good
Book because he had a heart and an eye to discern Wisdom,
and an utterance to render it forth."
INGREDIENTS OF JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY
John P. Frcankt
A completed judicial biography represents a series of
problems solved; and some of those problems will be con-
sidered here. But before a biography can be analyzed in
terms of its subsidiary difficulties, there must be identifica-
tion of the basic purposes and goals in describing the life of
a judge.
The biographer's object can be stated only generally,
but the generalization need not be devoid of meaning. Biog-
raphy seeks to recount the events of a life with fidelity, but
it needs to be much more than a series of photographs, no
matter how detailed, of the stones over which the hero
strode. A biography portrays a life, but it must do so in
the written words of judges because the circumstances, or the total
philosophical fix, are not adequately taken into account. A rather
interesting example of such misconstruction is involved in the frequent
quotation of the late Chief Justice Hughes' statement: "We live under
the Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is .... "
[Speech before the Elmira Chamber of Connerce, May 3, 1907, in
Addresses, 139 (1908). Quoted in MASON, BRANDEIS: LAWYER AND
JUDGE IN THE MODERN STATE 1 (1933); CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE
SUPREME CouRT 1 (1934); HAINES, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT
IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, 1789-1835 title page (1944).]
The writer has in his possession a letter dictated by Chief Justice
Hughes, dated February 2, 1948, in which it is stated that this quota-
tion has been wrongly interpreted and given an implication Hughes
regarded as unfair to the Supreme Court of the United States. In
short, the legitimate interpretation is not that the Constitution is
whatever the judges say it is, but rather that the Constitution is what
the judges say it is.
t B.A. 1938, M.A., LL.B. 1940, University of Wisconsin; J.S.D.
1947, Yale University. Author of MR. JUSTICE BLACK, THE MAN AND
HIs OPINIONS (1949); The Appointment of Supreme Court Justices,
[1941] WIs. L. REV. 172, 343, 461.
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terms of the origins in American society of the particular
person studied, his place in the flow of American life and
culture, and his significance to posterity.
The application of this generality to judicial biography
gives peculiar difficulty because it requires that the judge's
work itself be constantly analyzed in terms of its relations
to the society in which the judge lives. The social signifi-
cance of legal subject matter may be obscure, and this en-
courages the easy transition to talk about legalisms instead
of talk about life. No one has ever attempted a full-length
judicial biography which has no more as an object than the
description of the legal technicalities encountered by the sub-
ject in the course of a full life, but occasionally a work sug-
gests that this may have been its goal.
The primary reason for writing a biography at all
should be to account for the course of social development in
its broadest sense, as that development relates to the life of
the judge. The relation of the protagonist to the life of his
time may not be an account of accomplishment-for example,
John Marshall molded the course of history while Peter V.
Daniel, a later Justice, merely resisted it; and a biography
of either should try to report the event as it was. But
whetfier the subject was a creator, a resister, or merely a
passive observer, by virtue of his position he had a neces-
sary relation to a course of public events, and the biographer
must illumine the events with the man.
With the understanding then, that the judge's biography
is a peephole into an era, we turn to some of the problems
in its creation. As usual, it is easier to identify problems
than to solve them. The difficulties may be divided into
six: the problems of (1) analysis of the legal work of the
subject; (2) analysis of the social meaning of the judge's
work; (3) discovery of the full range of the significance of
the subject's work; (4) analysis of the relations of the sub-
ject to the other members of the court on which he serves;
(5) exploration of the subject's prejudicial background; and
(6) style.
1. Analysis of legal materials. Judicial biographers are
drawn from intellectual backgrounds even more diverse than
are judges themselves; for while some may be lawyers,
others may be political scientists, historians, journalists, or
complete amateurs with no significant experience in any kind
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of writing or research. Although a license to practice law
does not automatically include a license to write biography,
the lawyer biographer at least begins with one advantage
the non-lawyer must somehow acquire: Lawyers as a group
have special advantages by virtue of their training to under-
stand thoroughly the legal materials with which the subject
worked.'
Since about half of the biographies of Supreme Court
Justices have been written by non-lawyers, it is fortunate
that they so frequently are able to master the technicalities
of our trade. Lawyers as reviewers of non-lawyer's biogra-
1. The skills of lawyers and non-lawyers in judicial biography
may be compared by analyzing a group of biographies in terms of
the six problems discussed in the text. The following table is a per-
sonal and necessarily highly subjective appraisal of six biographies
by lawyers and eight by non-lawyers. The classifications, to the extent
not apparent by the headings, are explained in the remainder of the
text above, and since the object is the comparison of work by lawyers
and non-lawyers, the works may as well be anonymous. The six books
by lawyers are taken from the following seven: TYLER, MEMOIR OF R.
B. TANEY (1872); BROOKS, WALTER CLARK (1944); FAIRMAN, MR.
JUSTICE MILLER (1939); THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL (1901); BEVERIDGE,
LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL (1916-19); PALMER, MARSHALL AND TANEY
(1939); STEINER, LIFE OF ROGER BRooE TANEY (1922).
The eight books by non-lawyers are taken from the following nine:
BENT, JUSTICE OLIvER WENDELL HOLMES (1932); TRIMBLE, CHIEF
JUSTICE WAITE (1938); SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY (1936); MASON,
BRANDEIS (1938); PRINGLE, LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT
(1939); LIEF, BRANDEIS (1936); MCLEAN, WILLIAM RUFUS DAY (1946);
CATE, LUCIUS Q. C. LAMAR (1935); HELLMAN, BENJAMIN N. CARDoZO
(1940).
(25)
Book Quality
of
Legal
Analysis
A 25
B 9
C 25
D 10
E 19
F 22
Biographies by Lawyers
(15) (10) (20) (10) (20)
Legal- Range Pre-judi- Intra-court Style Total
Social of cial Relations
Inter- Legal- Back-
relation- Social ground
ships Discussion
15 7 20 6 18 91
5 2 5 2 7 30
15 10 16 10 18 94
9 2 8 3 7 39
6 7 10 2 5 49
13 10 15 6 10 76
10 6
Biographies by
9 7
15 '7
2 2
0 0
11 10
8 2
0 1
4 5
12
Non-Lawyers
20
20
13
17
20
12
12
12
10 6 4 16 5 16 57
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phies are sometimes captious in the rigor of their aspersions
on the failure of the author to indicate an understanding
of subtle procedural distinctions. At the same time many
non-lawyer's books do fail in this respect, particularly when
the author gets outside the broad areas of constitutional law
with which he is most familiar.
2. Social analysis of the judge's work. Since the prime
object of biography is the determination of the meaning of
the judge's work or philosophy in relation to the life of the
community, it is the biographer's task to explore the full
social reach of the law as the judge participates in its develop-
ment. Authors show a widely variant skill in putting legal
materials into their proper perspective in relation to the
policies of the community, and all too frequently lawyers'
habits of treasuring technical analysis for its own sake makes
for preoccupation with the purely technical. Undiscerning
phrases, loose talk, or hollow formulas may be substituted
for analysis; and generalities about "preservation of state's
rights" or "maintenance of the tri-partite system" have a
way of cluttering the books at the expense of the identifica-
tion of the interests that vaunt these battle cries.
It is here that technical understanding is particularly
essential to the author, for he is required to identify the
borders of the legally possible. The judge, it is true, is a
policy making official of government, with a range of choices
to be made in particular cases on policy grounds; but he is
not a legislator and has not a legislator's freedom in making
the law. He must operate within the framework of the
legal system. The biographer is required to identify the
cases in which his subject was bound by rules of judicial
behavior which he found compelling to reach particular re-
sults, as distinguished from those in which he exercised real
choice. -2
3. Discovering the range of the significant. The chal-
lenge to the biographer's skill is frequently to discover the
2. An example is the case of Fisher v. Hurst, 333 U. S. 147 (1948),
at last year's Term of the Supreme Court. In that case the Court
had decided that Oklahoma must provide "equal" legal education for
its Negro citizens, but a 7 to 2 majority found that the matter of
"equality" in those particular circumstances could not be decided be-
cause the matter was presented by the procedure of mandamus on a
clearly inadequate record. Is a biographer to treat the case as a de-
cision reflecting a judgment concerning segregation, or merely an in-
evitability of the law of procedure with no significance greater than
evidence of judicial intention not to expand the function of mandamus?
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full meaning of a particular bit of the judge's work. The
difficulty arises when the consequences of a decision are broad
and real, but obscure.
Frequently biographers concentrate on the obvious, re-
viewing only a judge's constitutional decisions, and not all
of those. But constitutional law is only one part, and not
necessarily the most important part, of a judge's work.3 To-
day the most important cases are likely to be statutory in-
terpretations, particularly in the field of trade regulation,
while 100 years ago the bulk of the work of the Supreme
Court was in commercial and property fields; but in either
era, constitutional law is only a part of the important judi-
cial work.
Thus the biographer's own training must provide for
him a divining rod which bends appropriately when his
reading carries him near the stuff for which he looks. This
case may involve only a squabble over a single tract of land,
and perhaps it should be ignored; but it may be that this
is the case upon which the disposition of the land empires
of California depended. That case may involve only a quar-
rel over a shipping accident; but it may be that most of the
admiralty jurisdiction grew from it. A third case may be
"only a bills and notes case"; but if it was that particular
bills and notes case referred to as Swift v. Tyson, it will need
the dignity of full length discussion. Even in the deserts
of the law there may be oases of excitement; and the biog-
rapher must find them.
4. Analysis of the relation of the subject to his brother
judges. Included here are two related, but distinct, prob-
lems: first, the establishment of the judge in proper per-
spective with the rest of the bench on which he served, and
second, the analysis of the interrelations of court personnel.
Biographers tend to exaggerate the importance of their
subjects. The Supreme Court of the United States has had
its quota of members who are important but humdrum. For
every Oliver Wendell Holmes there have been five Joseph
Rucker Lamars. Many of the Lamars were fortunate to
shoulder their way into as much as two inches in the metro-
politan obituary columns; and few will ever be the subject
3. In a selection of the 33 most important cases, from a social
standpoint, at the October 1947 Term of the Supreme Court, approxi-
mately half were not constitutional cases. Frank, The United States
Supreme Court, 1947-48, 16 U. OF CHI, L. REv. 1, 46, n.164 (1948).
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of biographies. But there are intermediate figures whose
stories will be told, men like Justice Harlan or Chief Justice
Fuller. One of the tasks of their biographers will be to
determine the real significance of these judges. Of Harlan's
reasoning power his colleague Holmes once said he "did not
shine either in analysis or generalization and I never troubled
myself much when he shied. I used to say that he had a
powerful vise the jaws of which couldn't be got nearer
than two inches to each other.' 4 Fuller looked at himself
in relation to his more distinguished brethren shortly after
his own appointment and said, "no rising sun prevails with
these . . . luminaries blazing away with all their ancient
fires." These are the kind of sound contemporary judg-
ments that are wont to disappear in 500 pages of biography,
in the course of which the author convinces himself that his
subject deserves greater distinction than his own generation
saw.
As part of putting the subject of a biography into his
proper relationship to his brethren, the author must ferret
out the relations of the Justices among themselves. I do not
mean here to put a premium on the gathering of silly gossip.
Justice Stone may have felt that his brother Butler was a
brute or his brother McReyraolds a churl, and Cardozo may
have been happier in Albany than in Washington without
there being anything very significant in it. But all of the
facts, even little ones, may have significance in a setting of
more facts. If the biographer studies the influence of the
home upon the Justice, he certainly ought to study the in-
fluence of a brother judge; and the consequences of the
conference may be affected by the demeanor of its conduct. 6
5. Discovery and analysis of pre-judicial background.
Of course a major part of the biographer's task is the re-
counting of the subject's life prior to his judicial appoint-
ment. Frequently, as in Pringle's Taft or Mason's Brandeis,
this may be in bulk at least the most important part of the
biography.
The significance of this part of the biographer's work
is too obvious to warrant any comment except that it is
4. HOLmEs-PoLLOCK LETTERS 7, 8 (Howe ed. 1941).
5. FAIRM~Ax, MR. JUSTICE MILER 389 (1939).
6. Chapter 15 in TRIMBLE, CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE (1938), is an
example of the fine work that can be done in digging out important
material on judicial interrelations.
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frequently inadequate, particularly in accounts of the forma-
tive years. There is a tendency to facile foolishness, as for
example some observations on the ancestry of the subject
followed by the inevitable "from these sturdy ancestors (our
hero) drew the outstanding qualities" of such and such. My
own experience with work on Justice Daniel is that the study
of his life prior to his appointment is a more difficult and
time consuming task than the account of his life and work
on the bench.
6. Style. That which is to be read must be readable,
and some judicial biographies leave the impression that this
simple platitude has been forgotten. Clarity, simplicity, and
sheer verbal attractiveness must be part of the biographer's
goal, and lawyer biographers in particular may have trouble
in achieving them.
There is something in a lawyer's professional training
which seems to kill top-notch writing skill as that quality
is customarily evaluated. It is hard to name six Supreme
Court Justices in our history who wrote really well, and
the quality of ponderousness in particular moves over to
biography by lawyers. The typical lawyer's prose is perfectly
well constructed, but it is frequently tedious and, for the
intelligent lay reader, needlessly obscure. There are no
terms or conceptions in the law which cannot be translated
into comprehensible English.
Perhaps lawyers' style is maligned enough when the
first topic which springs to mind in connection with it is its
frequent unintelligibilty to non-lawyers. But of course the
problem is not solved when this hurdle is overcome, for it
remains to make the work not only intelligible but inter-
esting. This may be as much a product of vocabulary and
phrase as of subject matter-it may be that our modern
law of free speech results not so much from the position
Justice Holmes took in the Abrams case, but from the way
he expressed himself. Sandburg's Lincoln, Schlesinger's
Jackson, or Bower's Beveridge have much to teach legal
biographers on matters of style.
The great judicial biographies-Beveridge's Marshall,
Fairman's Miller, and Swisher's Taney, to name three of
the best-illustrate the combination of high technical legal
skill with high technical historian's skill. They add read-
ability and a profound sen5e of the social meaning of their
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subjects' work. There are about a half dozen works which
have so combined the ingredients of judicial biography as to
be great books. If we are to obtain a serious understanding
of the Supreme Court as an institution of American gov-
ernment, more are needed.
THE JUDGE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Carl B. Swishert
The life of every human being is, to some extent, a
product of the impact of current events and his cultural
heritage one upon the other. Judges, more than people in
most other walks of life, are steeped in a segment of the
accumulated knowledge of the past. By virtue of their train-
ing in the subject matter and procedure of law and their
professional obligation to apply it, they tend toward pre-
occupation with social stability rather than with social
change. Whatever the leanings of the individual judge, how-
ever, his judicial performance must constitute a bridge be-
tween conditions of the past which gave rise to law and the
conditions of the present to which the law is applied. In giv-
ing content and contour to law in the process of deciding
cases, the judge acts as a frontiersman. If he functions be-
hind the protective covering of judicial robes, he operates
nevertheless upon the raw materials of the changing social
order. The measure of the effectiveness of a judge at the
Supreme Court level, indeed, is his ability at critical points
to define harmonious relationships between nominally static
rules of behavior proceeding out of the past and the dynamic
behavior of his own day.
In the process of interpreting the Constitution and fed-
eral statutes, the Supreme Court justice usually has a nar-
row but enormously important area of discretion. Within
restricted dimensions, he may; depending upon the figure,
go right or left, east or west, upward or downward. What-
ever the course or the extent of his deviation, however, no
t A.B. 1926, Pomona College; M.A. 1927, Ph.D. 1929, BrookingsGraduate School. Thomas P. Stran Professor of Political Science,Johns Hopkins University. Author of THE GROWTH OF CONSTITUTIONAL
POWER IN THE UNITED STATES (1946); AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT (1943); ROGER B. TANEy (1936); STEPHEN J. FIELD:
CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW (1930).
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